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Abstract 
 
Movement variability has emerged as a critical research component in the field of neural motor 
control. This chapter explains why movement variability can be seen as such a rich resource for 
studying neural development and ASD. This cannot be done without a framework for 
understanding the relationship between neural control, movement and movement sensing. Thus 
in the process of explaining why we should study movements several analytical and empirical 
aspects of motor-sensed variability from self-generated actions are recast, as are their putative 
role in the development of motor- sensory-sensed maps of external stimuli present in social 
settings. Overall, the Chapter offers a new lens for the research and treatments of 
neurodevelopmental disorders on a spectrum. In particular, disorders such as Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) giving rise to different social manifestations are discussed within the renovated 
unifying framework of kinesthetic reafference using the new micro-movements data type paired 
with new accompanying analytics. 
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Introduction 
Autism has been defined as a disorder of social cognition, interaction and communication where 
ritualistic, repetitive behaviors are commonly observed. But how should we understand the 
behavioral and cognitive differences that have been the main focus of so much autism research? 
Can high-level cognitive processes and behaviors be identified as the core issues people with 
autism face, or do these characteristics perhaps often rather reflect individual attempts to cope 
with underlying physiological issues?  Much research presented in this volume will point to the 
latter possibility, i.e. that people on the autism spectrum cope with issues at much lower 
physiological levels pertaining not only to Central Nervous Systems (CNS) function, but also to 
peripheral and autonomic systems (PNS, ANS) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013).  The question that 
we pursue in this chapter is what might be fruitful ways of gaining objective measures of the 
large-scale systemic and heterogeneous effects of early atypical neurodevelopment; how to track 
their evolution over time and how to identify critical changes along the continuum of human 
development and aging.   
 
We suggest that the study of movement variability—very broadly conceived as including all 
minute fluctuations in bodily rhythms and their rates of change over time (coined micro-
movements (Figure 1A-B) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013))—offers a uniquely valuable and 
entirely objectively quantifiable lens to better assess, understand and track not only autism but 
cognitive development and degeneration in general. This chapter presents the rationale firstly 
behind this focus on micro-movements and secondly behind the choice of specific kinds of data 
collection and statistical metrics as tools of analysis (Figure 1C).  
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Figure 1. Characterization of multi-layered sensory-motor systems. (A) Taxonomy of layers of motor 
control. (B) Different waveforms registered with wearable sensors across different layers of the nervous 
systems give rise to different types of minute fluctuations in amplitude and timing (micro-movements 
defined in Part I – Chapter 1 of the book). (C) Analytics for personalized medicine integrate multi-
sensory micro-motions and characterize noise-to-signal transitions across multiple levels in A and B.  
 
In brief the proposal is that the micro-movements, obtained using various time scales applied to 
different physiological data-types (some examples in Figure 1), contain information about 
layered influences and temporal adaptations, transformations and integrations across 
anatomically semi-independent subsystems that crosstalk and interact. Further, the notion of 
sensorimotor reafference is used to highlight the fact that these layered micro-motions are sensed 
and that this sensory feedback plays a crucial role in the generation and control of self-generated 
movements in the first place. In other words, the measurements of various motoric and rhythmic 
variations provide an access point not only to the “motor systems”, but also access to much 
broader central and peripheral sensorimotor and regulatory systems. Lastly, we posit that this 
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new lens can also be used to capture influences from systems of multiple entry points or 
collaborative control and regulation, such as those that emerge during dyadic social interactions 
(further explained in Section 2 Chapter 4.) 
Movements as richly layered reafference 
Turning now to the first core aspect of bodily movement that we want to highlight in this 
chapter, namely that movement contains complex re-afferent system information. This re-
afferent complexity serves to ground and justify our core methodological proposal that the 
micro-structures of movement variability and their shifting statistical signatures can be measured 
and therefore represent a rich opportunity for objective assessment of neural and auto-regulatory 
functioning.  
 
The reafference principle 
The concept of reafference stems from the work of von Holst and Mittelstaedt in the 1950’s as 
they try to capture the circularity of movement and sensation. They write: “Voluntary movements 
show themselves to be dependent on the returning stream of afference which they themselves 
cause”. The core idea is that a movement-dependent sensory signal, i.e. the “reafference”, is ever 
present in the organism that moves at will as it interacts with its surroundings, and thus that the 
overall afferent is layered and due to both self- and externally-generated causes. The self-
recognition and eventual anticipatory prediction of the systems own self-initiated movements has 
gained influence in the context of the contemporary notion of “smart (probabilistically 
predictive) sensing” used today in portable media such as cell phones, tablets, appliances and 
cars. Yet the concept is rooted back in the pioneering works of these physiologists ((Von Holst 
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and Mittelstaedt 1950, Von Holst 1954, Grusser 1995). We see their principle of sensorimotor 
reafference as a tremendously important insight that is still overlooked in many areas of 
neuroscience and clinical practice today. Most crucially reafference has been ignored in nearly 
all areas dealing with autism spectrum disorders.   
 
Von Holst and Mittelstaedt were interested in how we can sense the external world, given this 
predicament of sensing through self-generated movement. Like earlier theorists such as (Dewey 
1896) in philosophy, (Uexküll 1928) in theoretical biology, and later (Gibson 1979, Gibson 
1960) in psychology, they challenged the notion of the “stimulus” as something that simply 
appears passively as an “input” for the organism. Rather the isolation of the stimulus is in a sense 
already an accomplishment of the active sensorimotor organism. The predicament of the 
organism seems to be that it needs a certain predictive knowledge of self and world in order to 
perceive these in the first place. In other words, the organism is always in a sort of 
hermeneutically circular situation where its sensorimotor history serves as the anchor for both 
perception and action in the present.  
 
Interestingly it is only fairly recently that the field of predictive coding and Bayesian statistics 
has brought these insights and von Holst’s reafference principle to mainstream perception 
research (Friston, Thornton, and Clark 2012). However, the reafference principle has been 
enormously influential in the area of motor control and many theories about “internal models”,  
“efference copies”, “corollary discharge” and “error minimization” have been developed 
(Wolpert and Kawato 1998, Wolpert, Miall, and Kawato 1998, Haruno, Wolpert, and Kawato 
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2001, Wolpert and Miall 1996) trying to map how more precisely this principle of reafference 
might be implemented physiologically and/or computationally. Questions have been raised 
pertaining to the actual nature of the efferent command, how this efferent signal is linked to the 
expected afferent input, how this expectation is compared and used to interpret the actual 
afference input and which of these “signals” are used as “posteriors” to update which parts of 
systems of “priors” etc. (Kording and Wolpert 2004, 2006). We shall not here try to settle these 
still live theoretical and empirical debates over how best to understand specific reafference 
processes nor try to model of how various aspects of these feedback mechanisms are embodied 
at different levels of the nervous system.   
 
However, we do want to alert to the problematic simplicity by which these questions of 
implementation are typically posed – not only by many contemporary motor control theorists but 
also by von Holst himself. Models for example mostly assume that we are dealing with one 
efferent signal at the time, being compared with a re-afferent such that a simple subtraction can 
generate an error signal that might directly translate to an “ex-afferent” signal pertaining to the 
perception of the external world. But in actuality our movements are temporally continuous and 
highly layered also within single motor channels. In this sense, sensory feedback might be used 
to adjust movement across many anatomically distinct loops and hierarchical levels. When 
reading the literature on motor control one could be misled into believing that all movement is 
goal-directed and under high-level intentional control (Shadmehr and Wise 2005). However such 
types of movements actually represent a rather small fraction of our overall bodily movements. 
Thus the question is how we understand the regulation and reafference also of more spontaneous 
and non-goal directed actions (Torres 2011), and further how this sort of reafference might work 
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in concert with—and perhaps inform—our cortical “priors” for goal-directed and intentional 
action control.  
 
As mentioned it is a core aspect of von Holst and Mittelstaedt’s original principle that raw 
sensory input is not simply a passive reflection of the external world but always sensed 
throughout own active movements. One way to think of this central insight is that our perception 
of the external world in a sense always involves an active “subtraction of self”. To get to what 
von Holst and Mittelstaedt called the “exafference”, i.e. the perception of the world beyond the 
expected effects of ones’ own self-produced movement, various subtractions seem to take place. 
However, the question is: How does the organism know what part of the overall “afference” is 
the “reafference” i.e. the expected product of its own movement? A big complication here is the 
fact that we are actually physically embodied living creatures – that we are not simply dealing 
with abstract motor commands executed to digital perfection. Rather our bodies represent an 
intricate orchestration of multitudes of subsystems at mind-boggling plentiful levels of 
description. The question is, how do we know what to subtract from what? To produce 
controlled movements it seems that we need to empirically update not only our predictions about 
the physical and social world but also about our own bodies. And by bodies we do not here 
simply mean our sensorimotor machinery but our bodies as autonomically regulated and 
physically and socially impacted. Accordingly, we need a model of reafference that accounts for 
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our continuous exploration of multiple simultaneously changing aspects of self, others and 
world1.  
 
To elucidate this need for a more complex model it might be helpful to take a closer look at this 
extreme complexity of our embodiment and thus of what might be seen as forms of “reafference” 
to begin with. To do this we shall in the following two sections, for the purposes of analysis, 
look in turn at movements as respectively outputs and inputs. Note that this division is purely 
methodological, not a claim that these can be isolated in practice. To the contrary, the reafference 
principle reminds us that movements and bodily rhythms are always simultaneously produced 
and sensed.  
Movements as output revealing many layered influences  
Our bodily movements and rhythms are products of many complex and heterogeneous influences 
stemming from within the central and peripheral nervous systems and spanning phylogeny and 
ontogeny. Further movements also carry effects of a whole host of other physiological and 
external physical and social influences. One can thus see the continuous stream of bodily 
motions and rhythms as a product not only of some current conscious mental state or regional 
brain activity but as an expression of the state of the entire contextually embedded organism as 
well.  
 
                                                
1 Note that von Holst and Mittelstaedt avoided some of these complexities through their focus on eye-movements 
rather than body movements. They took the main afferent in vision to simply be the retinal modulation and showed a 
minimal regard for bodily proprioceptive channels involving far higher number of degrees of freedom than the eye. 
  
9 
This layered nature of the peripheral movement is extremely important to keep in mind as we 
analyze the complex data measured and collected e.g. by wearable sensors on bodily parts during 
a particular set of contextually situated activities.   If one to the contrary thought of the cortical 
motor system more or less as a digital command center, functioning in relative isolation and 
independently from other bodily processes and influences, and as producing each output 
independently of previously sensed movement, then one might think that what movement 
sensors would measure would be revealing only of this modular cortical motor function. 
However, such abstract assumptions ignore not only the re-entrant and complex integrative 
nature of the cortical motor output but also the entire sub-cortical, peripheral and physical 
embodiment of the movement system which all contributes to the patterns of variability found at 
the level of the actual embodied movement. To make palpable this point about dynamic 
complexity and heterogeneity it is informative to look beyond cognitive neuroscience to the 
fields of evolutionary, developmental and functional anatomy.  
 
We shall in the following return to the question of control, but here just notice that the movement 
“output” measured at the periphery is subject to both physical forces and biological regulatory 
influences far beyond our volitional and narrowly cortical control.   
Movements as input revealing what must be coped with 
By objectively measuring and characterizing the current variabilities and patterns of movement 
change one can see this not only as readout of the movements (actively) self-produced by a given 
embodied system but also of what the nervous system of this person has to cope with. In other 
words, the continuous and distributed brain-body feedback circularities are layered into 
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overlapping movement sequences discussed in Section 2 Chapter 4, also serve as kinesthetic 
inputs. Whether these movements are consciously tracked or transpire largely beneath 
awareness, they feed back into the system. When considering this fact that our movements are 
sensed and serve as input, the quality and characteristics of this sensory input becomes 
important. i.e. does it read as a useful or rather a noisy, random or confusing signal? What would 
it mean for a typically developing system to receive the given type of kinesthetic input rather 
than another? What tools would be needed to extract systematized information from the 
variations at hand? Consensus is growing that the peripheral and central nervous systems must 
contain various “priors” i.e. expectations about the barrage of sensory changes that happens at 
the bodies’ many receptors. These priors can then help us sort apart the many layers of 
influences contained in the sensory input.  
 
Following the hypothesis of von Holst & Mittelstaedt there might be some sort of internal signal 
– perhaps an “efference copy” – that allows a system to sort its overall afferent input into 
respectively “reafference” and “ex-afference.” However, as we have underscored earlier, the 
actual efference, in the sense of the actual peripheral movement, is a rather complex and layered 
affair. In other words, the “efference copy” or more broadly embodied expectation better be 
layered and complex as well, to be able to tease apart and decompose the signals of the returning 
afferent barrage. The simplistic picture of one isolated afference quantity minus one isolated 
efference quantity is simply not going to cut it even if we limit our consideration to one sensory 
modality or even one receptor channel in isolation.  
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Also note that in a broad sense of “priors” many such expectations are precisely distributed and 
embedded in the functional anatomy of both peripheral and central systems. One can thus see not 
only cortical sensory feedback expectations, but also baseline firing rates, average conduction 
times given myelination etc. as involving priors.  The idea here is that the baseline firing rate 
gives rise to expectations which are communicable at least in the sense that the broader 
expectations of the sensorimotor system has been adapted to these. With this notion of 
anatomically distributed priors we now start to see how the expectations pertaining to higher-
level events and volitional action not only carry traces of the overall embodiment but rely on the 
predictable behavior of this broader physiological system. This is an important part of our 
interpretation of the reafference hypothesis as it would suggest that we should think of deliberate 
action control and high-level perception as always interacting with and dependent on much 
broader peripheral—and often cultural and social—systems. Meaning one might similarly 
interpret some priors about the physical and social environment as not explicitly represented but 
as more distributed and implicitly adapted to. These are all issues that need more empirical 
elucidation.  However, they alert us to the possibility of “corrupted” or unreliable priors at all 
these levels.  
Continuous re-entrant historicity, integration and (voluntary) control 
Now we have looked at the complexity of the measurable movements at the periphery, and how 
this both reflects the many causal influences and also can be seen as a complex sensory input that 
the organism needs to try to understand, anticipate the consequences of and control. So far we 
have mostly focused on the sensory “understanding” part. However, this understanding is 
intimately linked to processes of action control necessarily requiring estimation, prediction and 
confirmation about the current and impending actions and their sensory consequences. How to 
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tease apart what is conducive of positive reward for the system from what to avoid in future 
encounters will require evaluation schemas that “remember”, store and retrieve information in 
some (prospective) statistical sense. 
 
Given sensorimotor circularity, separating active willed movement variability from supportive 
spontaneous variability may actually be possible when considering long histories of sensory 
consequences continuously sampled in unbroken re-afferent sensorimotor loops.  It is a core 
aspect of our proposal that this temporal feedback circularity is not just adding random noise as 
others have pointed out (Faisal, Selen, and Wolpert 2008), but serves a key feature of adaptive 
and integrative sensorimotor and regulatory control. As we have expressed it in an earlier paper: 
“Not all variability is created equal,” (Brincker and Torres 2013) and clearly self-sensing 
movement noise influences noise that comes from other parts of its own body and over time 
might become a meaningful signal in the overall re-afferent economy. Mechanisms that help the 
nervous systems recognize internal phase transition from spontaneous random noise to 
systematic, well-structured noise (i.e. signal) shall aid in the detection and distinction of 
deliberateness vs. spontaneity (Kalampratsidou and Torres 2016) present both in one own 
movements and in those of other social interaction partners. This is a testable hypothesis under 
the new proposed lens of micro-movements’ kinesthetic sensing. 
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Figure 2 Stagnation in neuromotor development in the newborn and beyond. (A-C) Index of risk for 
neurodevelopmental derail characterized by lack of noise-to-signal transitions in acceleration-dependent 
micro-movements measured as a function of the rate of physical growth (weight, body length and head 
circumference) longitudinally tracked in newborn babies for 6 months. (D) Maturation in noise-to-signal 
transition in typical development (cross-sectional data 3-25 years old) showing the decrease in noise and 
the shift from skewed to symmetric shapes of probability distribution functions from velocity-dependent 
micro-movements. (E) Stagnation in noise-to-signal transitions in autism spectrum disorders (cross-
sectional data from 3-25 years old) lacking the decrease in noise and the absence of shifts to symmetric 
PDFs. 
In sum, we hypothesize the existence of a proper sensory-motor variability environment as a 
necessary ingredient to scaffold the emergence of a predictive, anticipatory code realizable from 
the inherent statistical properties of actively generated movements. Such movements generated 
under schemas that successfully compensate for transduction and transmission delays within the 
nervous systems will go on to form a foundation for the sort of anticipatory coding required for 
adaptive and fruitful behavior and social exchange. The question is how the actually embodied 
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and embedded historical organism succeeds in this feat of knowing, predicting ahead and 
controlling its own movements and isolating and interpreting relevant sensory signals while 
temporarily discarding or downplaying irrelevant ones within a given context. It is clear that this 
intricate resolution within the individual’s nervous systems could fail to develop properly or 
break down in multiple ways, and one should not be surprised to find atypical sensorimotor 
variations in babies born with complications (Torres, Smith, et al. 2016a) (Figure 2A-C) 
conducive in some cases to neurodevelopmental disorders such as ASD as compared to 
neurotypical controls (Figure 2D-E). Disorders of sensory-motor systems are quantifiable as 
well in neurodegenerative cases such as Parkinson’s disease and in de-afferentation (Torres, 
Cole, and Poizner 2014). In the latter case, stochastic signatures overlapping with those of ASD 
individuals have been quantified at the motor output (Torres, Isenhower, et al. 2016). Further, 
individual reafference sets the stage for the social exchange with others – and can be reciprocally 
shaped by such exchanges (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Many of the estimation, 
transformation and prediction processes that take place within the person (Figure 1) are thus 
bound to extend to the social dyad (see next Section 2 Chapter 4 for an expansion on this 
proposition).  
 
Voluntary control & stability: How being still on command is itself an 
accomplishment  
With this notion of reafference in hand not only singling out the “stimulus” but also holding the 
body still becomes an accomplishment. To paraphrase the American polymath of the 19th century 
Charles Sanders Pierce, given the historicity of the world what needs explaining is not instances 
of change but rather instances of apparent stability (Peirce 1891). In other words, in terms of 
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biological and cognitive development how do we succeed in developing stable structures and 
relations, and what are the active processes of maintenance that go into the creation of these 
stabilities? Take the simple command of remaining still while participating in a regular cognitive 
neuroscience experiment. Most existing techniques and analytical methods to study cortical 
surface activity require such stillness to minimize motion artefacts. Yet the field rarely admits to 
(1) the artificial nature of such imposed condition and (2) the level of volition that is required in 
order to maintain such stillness even for a few minutes.  
Figure 3 Excess noise accumulation from involuntary head micro-motions in ASD is present with or 
without psychotropic medication intake (A) but systematically increases with number of medications 
taken (B). Data extracted from involuntary head micro-motions of 1,048 individuals (including ASD and 
Controls) deposited in the Autism Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE) publicly available to 
researchers. 
Recent work involving 1,048 participants has revealed that excess noise accumulation in 
involuntary micro-motions of the head (while the person is in resting state) are present in 
individuals with ASD and ADHD but absent from neuro-typical controls (Figure 3A). Such 
excess noise signatures were consistently found regardless of differences in ages, ADOS-severity 
scores, IQ-levels and levels of social difficulties (Torres and Denisova 2016). For our purposes 
here note that any excess involuntary micro-motions in these neurodevelopmental disorders is 
bound to interfere with the ability to remain still on command. This ability, taken for granted in 
neuro-typicals, is indeed a great accomplishment of their nervous systems. We further 
hypothesize that the extent to which this ability is compromised may be revealing of the level of 
  
16 
severity concerning disconnects between the (intentional) desire to voluntarily control bodily 
motions and the actual realization of this will.  
New data and new analyses are needed 
This idea of reafference and embodied heterogeneity and historicity is ignored by most 
traditional cognitive theories of mind and action, and therefore also from common 
methodologies and practices of data collection and statistical analyses. Given this absence it is 
perhaps not surprising that the very information sought is entirely missing from the core 
description of the phenomena at hand. One critical problem in this regard is that the methods 
employed in the current key disciplines defining and treating autism, often predefine global-level 
behavioral categories and formulate discrete segments unambiguously captured by the naked eye 
(Figure 4A). In so doing, these definitions result in researchers missing for example 
intermediate, more ambiguous (spontaneous) segments of the actions (see also Section 2 Chapter 
4). Such segments occur much too fast or at frequencies that escape the naked eye. In this sense 
conceptual categories are in part to blame for the failure to capture and analyze the rich 
variability of multiple influences across many layers and control levels of the ever-interacting 
CNS and PNS (Figure 1A). This use of high-level categorization of behavior thus seems 
analogous to if one were to use biased instrumentation with poor spatio-temporal resolution, and 
then without any awareness of or attention to these limitations conclude that the data collected 
represented all the relevant phenomena.   
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Figure 4. Moving beyond the one size fits all model used to analyze the statistics of human behavior. (A) 
Assuming and enforcing normality in data that is inherently not normally distributed. Kinematic 
parameter (speed m/s temporal profiles) taken across epochs (e.g. pointing trials) of a motor control 
experiment are averaged under the assumption of Gaussian mean and variance thus smoothing out the 
minute fluctuations that provide information about the noise-to-signal ratios and their transitions from 
spontaneous random noise to systematic, well-structured noise (signal) with predictive power. The a 
priori imposed Gaussian assumption is applied to all population data discarding as well individual 
features critical for the implementation of personalized medicine models. (B) Individualized approach 
does not assume a theoretical distribution but rather estimates it from the empirical data. Kinematics data 
time series has a segment highlighted with a bar representing the data in (A) continuously registered and 
used as it accumulates information about the person. The historicity of the data is then reflected in the 
changing shapes and dispersions of the non-stationary data. Each person spans a family of probability 
distributions and it is the rates of change of noise-to-signal transitions that uniquely define the person’s 
responses to context, goals and treatments. The minute fluctuations in the data and their cumulative 
history are preserved in this individualized approach amenable for the personalized medicine model as 
applied to the fields of neurology and neuropsychiatry. 
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Further, another set of problems may arise when low-level variability is studied, but most 
researchers i.e. in the areas of motor control (1) acquire data under highly practiced tasks with an 
exclusive focus on goal directed movements; (2) analyze the data under pre-imposed linear 
models; (3) use parametric statistics under a priori assumptions of normality, further enforcing 
the notion of stationarity in data that is inherently stochastic with shifting dynamics (Figure 4B). 
Such impositions undermine our ability to empirically study the sensorimotor maturations and 
dynamic adaptations occurring in typical development. With the paucity of motor control data 
reflecting the highly non-linear nature of neurodevelopment (Thelen and Smith 1994, Smith and 
Thelen 1993) along with its true stochastic and non-stationary features (Torres, Smith, et al. 
2016b), it has been extremely challenging to even begin to frame the problems that an atypically 
developing nervous system may face (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013, Torres, Isenhower, et al. 
2016, Torres, Isenhower, et al. 2013), let alone propose a solution.  
 
Assessing the dynamics, acquisitions and temporal developments of statistical distributions 
characterizing physical sensorimotor parameters during typical neurodevelopment can add that 
missing layer of objective information that current psychological definitions of autism have 
failed to provide (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013, Torres, Isenhower, et al. 2016). Such a new step 
seems essential if we want to understand how the growing and developing nervous systems adapt 
and gain familiarity and control in the face of constantly changing bodies and environments. 
Only after we characterize the multi-layered influences of the nervous systems in typical 
neurodevelopment, will we begin to identify and characterize atypical manifestations. This will 
enable us to pose new questions and gain new insights into atypical processes partaking in any 
social exchange between the individual with neurodevelopmental challenges and others in the 
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social medium.  Note how this approach differs from current “deficit models” in psychiatry – 
where atypical development is seen as a failure to develop high level abilities without a systemic 
characterization of how this typical development dynamically comes about or of which systemic 
lower-level issues might make other behaviors and abilities adaptive for a given person.  
 
Further, and very importantly for our present purposes, scientists who do look at physical bodily 
variabilities typically enforce a priori assumptions of normality and linearity in the data 
(Kuczmarski et al. 2002, Flegal and Cole 2013). We argue that this practice completely fails to 
acknowledge the evidence that probability distributions change over time and in response to new 
conditions. Thus, while some parameters of well-practiced movements of TD adults often can be 
approximated by normal distributions, early and atypical development is precisely linked to 
skewed distributions of those same parameters and a prevalence of noisy and random movement 
variabilities. We now have multiple sources of evidence of neurodevelopmental stagnations 
where movement variabilities do not undergo the maturation and transitions quantified in typical 
development (Figure 2) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013, Torres, Isenhower, et al. 2016, Torres, 
Smith, et al. 2016b).  We propose that such stagnant variabilities – otherwise interpreted as 
corrupted movement priors – can be approximately mapped and precisely tracked over time if 
one lets go of a priori imposed assumptions of normality, linearity and stationarity.  Movement 
variabilities thus present us with extremely valuable data types not only for understanding both 
typical and atypical developmental trajectories but also for tracking learning and the 
effectiveness of therapeutic interventions.  They provide the counter intuitive notion that noise is 
signal in the nervous systems. 
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Using movement variability to move autism research forward 
Movements, their micro-fluctuations and their sensations provide a flow of feedback measurable 
in non-invasive ways. We argue that this continuous reentrant information simultaneously 
reflecting a layered peripheral output and input makes movement variations an incredibly rich 
lens through which to study neurodevelopment and in particular the systems’ ability to adapt to 
new tasks, integrate and transform feedback across various sensorimotor and autonomic channels 
and subsystems. In other words, rather than simply assuming we have a nervous system in 
control, we seek to measure the system’s ability to integrate across semi-autonomous subsystems 
and recover stability and control given constant change and perturbation.  The advent of rapidly 
advancing wearable sensing technologies now makes this project very feasible. These 
technologies enable non-invasive data collection and studies of peripheral micro-motions, as well 
as micro-motions of coupled bodily rhythms and various cognitive tasks. All of these movement 
variabilities can be accessed completely objectively at high resolutions and relatively low cost 
while the person naturally interacts with the surrounding social medium. 
 
In the context of autism research, the theoretical conception of “movement as reentrant smart 
(predictive) sensory feedback” and the use of its inherent variabilities as outcome measures thus 
seem like potent tools. However there are some methodological, conceptual and institutional 
barriers to progress that bears mentioning. 
 
Methodological & conceptual barriers 
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Movement issues in autism have been highlighted for decades (see e.g. (Damasio and Maurer 
1978, Donnellan, Hill, and Leary 2012, Donnellan and Leary 2012, Torres and Donnellan 
2012)), but with little consequence. One reason could be that there has been a lack of proper 
methodology to address its continuous, dynamic and stochastic flow in naturalistic social 
exchanges.  
 
There is now broad mounting evidence of the presence of sensory-motor issues in autism 
((Teitelbaum et al. 2002, Jansiewicz et al. 2006, Noterdaeme et al. 2002, Teitelbaum et al. 2004, 
Fournier, Hass, et al. 2010, Gowen, Stanley, and Miall 2008, Fournier, Kimberg, et al. 2010, 
Minshew et al. 2004, Jones and Prior 1985, Mostofsky et al. 2006, Rinehart et al. 2001, Rogers et 
al. 1996, Williams et al. 2001, Mosconi and Sweeney 2015, Mosconi et al. 2015, Brincker and 
Torres 2013, Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013, Torres, Isenhower, et al. 2016), among many others). 
Yet, in the field of autism sensorimotor issues are sadly still bluntly denied and excluded from 
consideration within core clinical and research constituencies.  
 
It is worth highlighting the arguments against movement issues as being central to ASD. Many 
have for example, pointed to 1) an absence of narrowly motor or gross level isolated movement 
issues in many people with autism and also 2) to the skillful and amazingly precise movements 
of certain musical prodigies on the spectrum (see (Silberman 2015) for such diverse account). 
Thus at this level of description it looks like a strong double dissociation of ASD and movement 
issues. Yet a paucity of actual physical quantification and measurements with millisecond time 
scale precision has accompanied such claims; claims that have been primarily based on 
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categorical interpretation of the observed phenomena.  Accordingly, autism has been clinically 
defined in purely descriptive cognitive and behavioral terms, as if behaviors in general did not 
involve movement and their sensations. As argued above, this definition assumes that all relevant 
evidence should follow preexisting high-level categorizations, and ignores that the naked eye 
cannot possibly see how the PNS and the CNS exchange feedback from actively produced 
motions. 
Institutional barriers: Clinical assessments & conflicts of interest 
Given what we know about sensorimotor issues, we suggest that the current clinical definition 
and use in assessment does not simply seem inaccurate, but it seems epistemically and morally 
problematic. A look at the current ADOS assessment practices is instructive here. The ADOS-2 
manual (Lord et al.) under the section Guidelines for Selecting a Module propose the 
following—to many innocent sounding—caveat:  
 
“Note that the ADOS-2 was developed for and standardized using populations of children 
and adults without significant sensory and motor impairments. Standardized use of any 
ADOS-2 module presumes that the individual can walk independently and is free of visual 
or hearing impairments that could potentially interfere with use of the materials or 
participation in specific tasks”  (Lord et al.)  
 
The above statement implicitly assumes that the person administering the test and selecting the 
module a priori knows whether or not the child has significant sensory-motor issues that could 
impede performance. Yet the naked eye of that person has limited capacity to make that 
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determination with any degree of certainty, not to mention that they would have to know 
beforehand what they were looking for.  
 
The crucial point is that objective quantification and characterization of physiological 
disturbances tied to sensory-motor phenomena is now possible. We can empirically assess and 
track such disturbances also longitudinally and thus objectively judge the sensory and somatic-
motor effects of various medications. Such assessment is equally possible in relation to 
behavioral therapies. 
 
Additionally, one can use similar methods during cognitive-social performance evaluated by the 
DSM and ADOS criteria. Specifically, it is possible to use the new statistical platform for 
individualized behavioral analyses (SPIBA) and wearable sensors to assess dyadic social 
exchange with millisecond time precision (see Section 2 Chapter 4).  
 
The idea here is to expand the notion of reafference to the social domain, and accordingly 
continuously track and analyze coupled rhythms and their mutual output-feedback loops during 
social exchange. In particular, this can be done during the types of staged social exchanges that 
observational inventories such as the ADOS-2 carry on (see Section 2 Chapter 4.)  These 
observational inventories have yet to go beyond the manual scores and their interpretation. 
Actually quantifying physiological signatures of nervous systems with neurodevelopmental 
issues as social exchanges unfold could reveal physiological signatures of entrained and 
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disjointed exchange. Nervous systems persistently receiving corrupted sensory-motor feedback 
are likely bound to operate in rather disjointed ways that we have yet to characterize (Brincker 
and Torres 2013). For example, Figure 5 shows some of the signatures of involuntary head 
motions polluting the resting state behavior of individuals with various forms of ADHD that 
occur with and without psychotropic medication intake. In terms of the social dyad, the effects of 
such corrupted feedback tend to be reflected in both agents, as the reciprocal interaction 
continuously unfolds in a given context (Whyatt et al. 2015a).    
Figure 5 Stochastic signatures of involuntary head micro-motions in ADHD and ASD estimated for 
the normalized peak fluctuations in linear and angular velocities. (A linear speed, B angular speed) 
Medication effects in ADHD subtypes (inattentive IN and combined C denoting hyperactive plus 
inattentive) on the stochastic signatures of involuntary head micro-motions for the normalized linear and 
angular peak velocities. Panels show the empirically estimated Gamma shape and scale parameters for the 
cases without and with meds corresponding to participants in the ADHD-200 database. 
Likewise, Figure 6A further stresses this point as it shows the interplay of the noise-to-signal 
ratio characterizing the signatures of involuntary head micro-motions in individuals with ASD as 
a function of ordinal data from incremental IQ scores across ages. These signatures change in 
Figure 6B in controls as they age and develop, but remain stunted across 6-60 years of age in 
ASD. Color bars show differences in the incremental values of the IQ as well. Each dot in this 
graph represents the Gamma moments of individuals above and below the median change in IQ 
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scores for 5 age groups. There are 10 points in each class of subjects, 2 per age group denoting 
the median ranked group. Gradients of red denote the controls’ IQ changes per age while blue 
shades denote those of the ASD. The size of the marker is the kurtosis of the probability 
distribution estimated from the micro-movements extracted from involuntary head motions. The 
z-axis is the shape (skewness) of the distribution whereby the controls converge to symmetric, 
Gaussian-like shapes while the ASD remain with very skewed shapes tending towards the 
Exponential range of the Gamma parameter plane(Torres and Denisova 2016). 
 
Figure 6. Stochastic signatures of head micro-movements differ with incremental changes in IQ 
with age. (A) Probability distribution functions fit to the frequency histograms of full IQ, verbal IQ and 
performance IQ scores for the case of absolute scores (Gaussian fit) and incremental scores (Gamma fit) 
corrected by age for both control typical CT and ASD participants. (B) Incremental scores for different 
age groups in CT and ASD obtained for different age groups ranging from 6 to 60 years old. Color 
corresponds to the rate of change of incremental full IQ with age. Values of 3 (excess skewness index) 
correspond to symmetric distributions while values below 3 are skewed distributions with heavy right tail. 
Youngest CTs are 6 years old on the bottom of the graph of the empirically estimated summary statistics. 
Note that the CT moments evolve with age. The mean values increase tending to slower rates of 
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involuntary head micro-motions in the linear displacement domain. The variance decreases as the CT age 
and the distributions become more symmetric, with higher kurtosis as well. In ASD from 6-60 years old 
their distributions remain heavily skewed at the level of the TD 6 year old. 
 
Along these lines of involuntary motions polluting the nervous systems of the individuals with 
ASD, the pervasive use of psychotropic medication across neurodevelopmental conditions poses 
a question about the long-term effects that combinations and dosages of such substances may 
have on a young, rapidly growing and developing nervous system. We simply do not know the 
answer to this question, but recent work involving large cross-sectional data from individuals 
with ASD and ADHD (Torres and Denisova 2016) reveals excess noise and randomness in the 
involuntary head motions that systematically increases with the use of psychotropic meds in 
relation to individuals with such disorders who do not take meds. Table 1 lists some of the 
commonly reported meds in the Autism Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE I) data base used 
in this recent study.   
Class (Psychotropic med) 
 
 
Medication Names 
 
 
 
Motor and Bodily Related 
Side Effects 
Antidepressants  
Fluoxetine, Sertraline hydrochloride, 
Trazodone, Escitalopram, 
Citalopram, Bupropion, 
Mirtazapine, Duloxetine 
hydrochloride, Venlafaxine, 
Paroxetine 
Tremors; paraesthesia; 
dizziness, drowsiness  
Stimulants  
Amphetamine and 
Dextroamphetamine, 
Lisdexamfetamine, 
Methylphenidate Extended 
release, Dexmethylphenidate, 
Dextroamphetamine sulfate 
Dizziness, drowsiness; 
twitching; convulsions 
Anticonvulsants  
Oxcarbazepine, Valproic acid, 
Lamotrigine 
Tremors; drowsiness 
Atypical antipsychotics  
Risperidone, Ziprasidone 
hydrochloride, Asenapine, 
Quetiapine, Aripiprazole 
Tremors, twitching; 
restlessness 
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Benzodiazepine 
anticonvulsant  Lorazepam 
Drowsiness; muscle 
trembling 
Alpha agonists  Guanfacine, Clonidine 
Restlessness; shakiness; 
dizziness 
Atypical ADHD medication 
(NRI)  Atomoxetine 
Tremors; dizziness, 
drowsiness 
Nonbenzodiazepine 
sedative-hypnotic  Eszopiclone 
Clumsiness; difficulty with 
coordination 
Nonbenzodiazepine 
anxiolytic  Buspirone 
Nervousness 
 
Table 1. Subset of psychotropic medications taken by participants with ASD in Figure 3B 
shown by medication class, and their reported motor and bodily related side effects. 
 
It should be underscored once more that the central tenet of this volume is to bridge current 
discrete criteria emphasizing cognitive and social issues with continuous criteria characterizing 
the bio rhythms of natural behaviors flowing during social exchange. The explicit goal is to reach 
a much more precise and individualized understanding of the entire spectrum of experiences that 
self-advocates and practitioners have expressed so forcefully against too narrow deficit models 
(Robledo, Donnellan, and Strandt-Conroy 2012, Donnellan, Hill, and Leary 2012, Donnellan and 
Leary 2012). Thus we stress that what we propose is a methodological and diagnostic use of the 
micro-movements as a new lens to understand the complex heterogeneous characteristics people 
experience on the autism spectrum both at an individual level and at the level of dyadic (and 
multi-party) social exchange. Accordingly, the idea is by no means to exclude the many 
autonomic, sensory, cognitive, behavioral and social challenges. Quite the contrary, the idea is to 
attempt to characterize these low and high-level ambiguous descriptions from a more systemic 
physiological perspective – with basis in the evidence that physical data can be collected non-
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invasively, under unrestrained conditions and continuously while employing contemporary 
wearable sensors.  
 
New analytics designed for the personalized use of wearable sensors now enable the objective 
characterization of such signals and their use in near real time making biofeedback available in 
parametric form during activities of daily living, therapeutic interventions and basic research 
(Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013, Torres, Yanovich, and Metaxas 2013, Whyatt et al. 2015b). Under 
these conditions such variability is now conceptualized as reentrant sensory flow that can 
become predictive (or not). It is in this potential for prospective (predictive) control and the self-
discovery of cause and effect relations from actively self-generated motions that we shall rest our 
hopes for habilitation and improvement of social exchange across the spectrum of 
neurodevelopmental disorders. Indeed, as it has been already demonstrated, in non-verbal 
children with ASD, the reentrant flow can begin to transition from random and noisy to 
predictive and systematic within a matter of minutes of using bio-sensory-motor feedback to 
evoke self-exploration, self-discovery of goals conducive of agency in the persons’ motions 
(Torres, Yanovich, and Metaxas 2013, Torres 2016).  
 
This methodology aiming to elicit and build self-emerging control is thus in a sense the inverse 
of the currently widely used methods of prompting and reinforcing predefined action types by 
external rewards, as done in the behaviorists tradition of animal-conditioning. Indeed, allowing 
self-exploration and autonomous detection of goals and voluntary control rewards the child 
internally simply by enabling active identification of action generation with sensory-motor 
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consequences during motor learning. Such schemas exploiting self-discovery of self-generated 
movements and their sensory consequences lead to the non- transient dampening of sensory-
motor noise (Torres, Yanovich, and Metaxas 2013) and retained gains even 4-5 weeks later, in 
the absence of practice. 
 
Warning against motor reductionism and neat cognitive modularity 
Note that the proposal is not that autism uniquely or reductively should be characterized as a 
problem of micro-movements. The central tenet of our work is to characterize current cognitive 
and behavioral symptom descriptions with objective means in non-invasive ways.  The 
ubiquitous presence of micro-motions of different time-scales and frequencies in all aspects of 
behavior enables the development and use of a statistical platform to measure these minute 
fluctuations in the nervous systems’ output. This methodology can be applied also in naturalistic 
social exchanges, by measuring the forms of social-output-feedback loops simultaneously co-
occurring within the person and between the agents in the social dyad. Using the changing 
signatures of micro-movements in such multi-layered contexts further allows advancing our 
understanding of such complex and heterogeneous phenomena as ASD above and beyond verbal 
descriptions and interpretations of continuous flow of actions, largely missed by the naked eye. 
 
Theoretically our proposal, to think of movements and their inherent variability as important 
forms of feedback to estimate sensory and somatic-motor consequences, is rooted in a non-
modular and more contextual and organismic view of human cognition. We are acutely aware 
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that many researchers work under different, more modular and brain-body dualistic paradigms 
that treat the brain as a bodiless organ and describe the emergent mental states in complete 
disconnect with physical states of the nervous systems. As matter of fact one can see the 
classifications used in the DMS-5 as to a large extent simply assuming what the philosopher 
Susan Hurley has labeled the “Classical Sandwich of Cognition”, i.e. the idea that there are neat 
divisions between sensory and motor systems and that central cognitive processes rely on a 
relatively modular neurological machinery that is independent not only of sensorimotor 
processes but also peripheral and autonomic systems more broadly (Hurley 2001).  Similarly 
Daniel Rogers has documented in great detail how 20th century psychiatry is ripe with examples 
of theoretically based arguments either denying or isolating motor and neurological issues from 
our understanding of psychiatric cases and psychological function more broadly (Rogers 1992).  
 
However, we see little current empirical evidence in support of blindly assuming such abstract 
models or of letting our assessment and classification of neurodevelopment depend on them. 
Given evidence pertaining to contextual influences and feedback in development, evolution, 
physiology, neurology and so many areas of molecular and cognitive neuroscience it seems that 
one would have to empirically prove any clean modularity of e.g. the motor system from the 
sensory systems, or of cognitive or cortical processes from sub-cortical / peripheral / autonomic 
systems. In short, it seems that the burden of proof might be on the researcher that assumes 
isolation rather than the one that starts with an assumption of possible integration and cross-talk 
between the many regulatory subsystems. To repeat the insight from Peirce, in a historical 
system it is stability rather than change that primarily calls for an explanation (Peirce and Moore 
1972). We thus do not deny or attempt to ignore that there are anatomically differentiated sub-
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systems that function with relative autonomy. Rather what we hope to do is to explain why and 
how this feat of relative autonomy, isolation and stability gradually self-emerges and is 
ultimately accomplished in typical neurodevelopment. Or in other words – how do we succeed in 
isolating and using meaningful signals in the cacophony of variabilities and noise that we are 
embodied and embedded in. We aim at discovering the specific ways in which such processes 
might be disrupted in various clinical cases, and thereby be better positioned to aid and support 
such processes when the organism faces developmental challenges. To summarize, we are not 
claiming that people with autism cannot move – we are hypothesizing that individually 
heterogeneous difficulties with various forms of regulatory and adaptive control will be reflected 
in the micro-structure of movement variability continuously registered as the person naturally 
interacts with physical objects – or e.g. the social medium of a clinician. 
  
However as discussed highly modular and narrow theoretical conceptions of movement prevail 
in the current clinical definition of autism, and symptoms are typically based on predefined 
cognitive categories associated with studies of a “bodiless brain” (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 
1985, Happe, Briskman, and Frith 2001, Happe and Frith 2006, Chakrabarti and Baron-Cohen 
2006, Ramachandran and Oberman 2006, Sucksmith et al. 2013). Reducing the level of inquiry 
to discrete descriptions and subjective interpretations of observable phenomena makes the 
problem unnecessarily intractable. But more importantly, ignoring the continuity and physical 
bases of behavior misses the opportunity to therapeutically close the feedback loops within the 
person’s nervous systems and also between the person’s nervous systems and those of the 
participating interlocutor in the social dyad.  
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Further, in terms of moving the research forward, existing approaches leave little room for blind 
reproducibility of results and limit constructive diversified discussion of possible methods to 
pose new questions and advance our basic understanding of this complex problem. Additionally, 
current cognitive theoretical constructs are not conducive to empirical questions that enable 
bridging the layer of inventories that these theories promote (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
2004, Baron-Cohen et al. 2005, Wheelwright et al. 2006), etc. with the layers of genetic research 
that could advance target treatments. 
 
We thus see pervasive human, financial, therapeutic and scientific consequences of the current 
too narrow cognitivist definitions, and hope that our new approach can contribute to a 
broadening of the conceptual landscape and thus the empirical science of autism. The new 
proposed approach can hopefully also contribute to the expansion and diversification of available 
therapies in the US by virtue of providing a concrete framework for outcome measures to enable 
insurance coverage (see Chapter 8 in Section 5). Note that this is independent of whether the 
intervention in question is medical or behavioral.  In terms of empathic understanding, we hope 
that looking at the dynamics of micro-movements will help transform the perception of this 
condition and thereby to some extent reframe actual interactions. One aspect here that it is often 
assumed in both clinical and educational settings is that the affected person is in full control of 
their behavior, but we suggest that such control is precisely an accomplishment that can be aided 
by special accommodations and therapeutic and medical expertise in various fields. Further, 
many symptomatic behaviors such as “stimming”, averted gaze, and ritualistic routines might be 
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understood as coping mechanisms supporting stability and control of perception and action. Thus 
rather than being taken as focal intended and communicative behaviors in the interaction, these 
might better be seen as personal accommodations, much like posture adjustments and autonomic 
responses such as blinking. Overall, one could hope that some of the bullying the children suffer 
today (Zablotsky et al. 2014) might be dampened in the face of new, more scientific definitions 
of the condition and the potential of public knowledge of the core physiological symptoms. 
Conclusion & Take Home Message 
In short, much like one might look at marine sediment and ice cores in order to e.g. infer and 
assess climate conditions of the past and further use this understanding to analyze the present, we 
suggest that biophysical rhythms output by the nervous systems contain a rich interlayered basis 
for assessing neurodevelopment. Further - and in contrast to the ice core analogy – because of 
the dynamic and stochastic nature of the motions embedded in the nervous systems rhythms and 
the nervous systems’ property of self-sensing its own self-produced movements, these motions 
(in the broadest sense of the word) can also provide an important handle for intervention and 
developmental support. Movement in this sense gives a dynamic window into neurodevelopment 
and the many influences of early interventions that are at present blindly performed. We need to 
know for instance, the effects that combinations of different drug classes (psychotropic or 
otherwise) may have on a developing nervous system. They were not tested in the first place 
with neurodevelopment in mind. We do not know what effects behavioral modifying techniques 
may have on the children’s nervous systems, beyond tantrums, self-injurious behaviors and 
anxiety attacks reported by self-advocates, parents and therapists. We do not know how to 
objectively and automatically track the balance between benefit and risk of any intervention 
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today. Even without directly revealing the causes of autism, movement variability does provide a 
new powerful physiological lens into all of these issues. As such, motion and its sensations are 
bound to become our great ally in beginning to unravel the dynamic evolving complexities of 
autism spectrum disorders, both in terms of development and when subject to treatments. It 
would be foolish not to take advantage of such a powerful new access point. In the next chapter 
we look at autism through this new physiological lens to go beyond purely psychological 
constructs. Through this lens we learn much more about autism than meets the eye. 
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